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TAKING KAWASHIMA SERIOUSLY: A
REVIEW OF JAPANESE RESEARCH ON
JAPANESE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND DISPUTING BEHAVIOR

SETSUO MIYAZAWA
This paper discusses Japanese research on legal consciousness
(ho-ishiki) and civil disputing. The author presents a recent explication of Takeyoshi Kawashima's concept of legal consciousness as a
cultural factor and also proposes to explore the possibility of treating
it as an individual, attitudinal factor. He also reviews large-scale
surveys of aggregate-level culture and studies on individual-level disputing behavior. The need and possibility of a longitudinal study of
individual disputing behavior that uses individual-level attitudes and
regional culture as explanatory variables is suggested.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Japan, the subject of this paper has been called hoishiki, or "legal consciousness."* This term was used in an article title as early as 1935 (Rokumoto, 1983b: 26). Legal consciousness has been so dominant an issue in subsequent Japanese law and society scholarship, particularly during the past
twenty years, that the Japanese Association of the Sociology of
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1986 annual
meeting of the Law and Society Association held in Chicago from May 29 to
June 1, 1986. It was prepared upon an invitation from Malcolm M. Feeley, a
member of the program committee for that meeting. The author is grateful to
J. Mark Ramseyer and Antoine Chalhoub for their assistance in editing that
paper. The Japanese Ministry of Education provided a travel grant for the
meeting. This slightly modified version benefited from comments from Jim
Inverarity and encouragement and assistance from the editor and the production editor of this journal.
* Kawashima (1982: 404-405) opposes the translation of ho-ishiki as
"legal consciousness." He says that he meant to include subconscious as well
as conscious elements of psychological phenomena, that his concept is based
not on psychology but on the sociology of culture or anthropology, and that he
used ho-ishiki as a convenient term to mean "a broader mental life as a
whole." He complains that he has been bewildered by and felt responsible for
the misleading translation of "legal consciousness" and approvingly refers to
the French translation of ho-ishiki as "mentalit." His protest notwithstanding, I use "legal consciousness" simply as the most conventional term for the
subject.
LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Volume 21, Number 2 (1987)
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Law (JASOL) chose it as the theme of its annual meetings
from 1982 to 1984. Someone should introduce the Japanese
scholarship on this subject to international colleagues. I would
like to perform this role.
With the publication of Kawashima's article "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan" (1963), Japan was represented
to international readers as a country with the apparently contradictory combination of rapid industrialization and extremely
few litigated cases and lawyers. Kawashima then made a fuller
presentation of his thesis in Japanese (1967, 1974 [for a partial
English translation]). He was interpreted as explaining this
anomaly in terms of the traditional legal consciousness that regarded the mobilization of the formal legal system as a threat
to social harmony and held a moralistic aversion to litigation.
Such a view quickly became the accepted wisdom both abroad
and at home.
Some foreign readers, particularly American Japanologists
in the field of law, no longer accept that view. Haley (1978,
1982) criticized it as "the myth of the reluctant litigant" and
presented an alternative that explained the relative infrequency of the mobilization of the formal legal system by institutional factors that discouraged the use of law. Since then, revisionist interpretations have been presented by younger
generations of Japanologists (for most recent examples, see
Bryant, 1984; Ramseyer, 1985a, 1985b; Upham, forthcoming).
Even nonspecialist law and society scholars have started to
doubt the conventional view of Japanese legal consciousness
(on the different responses of pollution victims supposedly
holding the traditional consciousness, see Kidder, 1983: 45-51;
Galanter, 1983: 57).
However, *thereare still authors who describe the Japanese
legal system as "the law of the subtle mind" (Kim and Lawson,
1979). Moreover, people such as former Supreme Court Chief
Justice Warren Burger and Harvard President Derek Bok who
are critical of American litigiousness and who advocate the introduction of informal means of dispute resolution seem to look
to Japan for a model (Ramseyer, 1985b: 604; Upham, forthcoming: 320-323). Favorable interest in Japan may also come from
those who criticize the legalistic administrative process in the
United States (Stewart, 1981; Harvard Law Review, 1981). Japanese-style administrative guidance may become their inspiration (Johnson, 1982).
Given this division among international scholars, empirical
Japanese research may be of particular interest. Unfortunately, probably due to the domination of law teachers in law
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and society scholarship in Japan, we have not yet accumulated
as much information as we need nor formed a consensus among
ourselves. In fact, one of the organizers of the JASOL conventions (Toshitani, 1985: 9) concluded after the first two meetings
on legal consciousness that we are only beginning to conduct
truly empirical studies. In this paper, I will summarize our
knowledge of the subject and present some preliminary ideas
for future research.
II.

CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Friedman (1977: 76; see also Friedman, 1975: chaps. 8, 9)
defines "legal culture to mean attitudes, values, and opinions
held in society, with regard to law, the legal system, and its various parts." Legal consciousness is another term for the same
concept.
We may analyze such attitudes, values, and opinions at
both aggregate and individual levels. I use the term "culture"
for the aggregate level and the term "attitude" for the individual level. This usage fits well the respective definitions of these
concepts in anthropology and in social psychology, for in anthropology "culture" refers to the norms, rules, and standards
implicit in the dominant patterns of behavior and social relationships within a group (Singer, 1968), while in social psychology "attitude" describes a learned behavioral predisposition
that is consistently favorable or unfavorable to a given object
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975).
Group culture and individual attitude may largely overlap
in coverage and content. We may not, however, assume that aggregate level relationships between culture and behavioral patterns always imply the same relationships for any individual
member. The impact of culture on individual behavior has to
be ascertained through analysis at the individual level. To understand the impact of culture and attitude on the mobilization
of formal legal systems, we need to conduct research at both
levels.
In this discussion, I shall: (1) present explications of
Kawashima's thesis with regard to both the proper understanding of his concept of legal consciousness (Rokumoto, 1986a, b)
and the possibility of treating legal consciousness as an attitudinal factor of individual law-related behavior, (2) summarize the
research on the existence and content of culture and on the
processing of individual disputes, and (3) make preliminary research design proposals that reflect these explications of the
Kawashima thesis and evaluations of the existing research.
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III.

EXPLICATIONS OF THE KAWASHIMA THESIS

Haley (1978: 359) regarded Kawashima as the major proponent of the belief that "the Japanese are an exceptionally nonlitigious people." He saw Kawashima as having solved the "dilemma posed by the institutional ideal of an active judiciary in
a nonlitigious society" by viewing "Japanese aversion to litigation as a gradually fading, traditional response" (ibid., p. 361).
Hence, Haley criticized Kawashima by citing statistics that indicated that Japanese litigation rates were both higher than in
some Western European countries and higher in Japan before
the war than after it. Haley should be credited for launching
the first serious criticism of the accepted view. Many Japanese
scholars, including myself, soon accepted his basic argument
that institutional factors that had been deliberately introduced
by the elite might have more impact than culture.
Rokumoto (1986a: 193-196, 269-274) has recently criticized
Haley for failing to understand the deeper meaning of the
Kawashima thesis. He argues that Kawashima was discussing a
general framework for perceiving and evaluating social relationships, not attitudes about a concrete system of positive law.
He distinguishes two levels of abstraction: "legal consciousness" and the more abstract "legal conception" (ho-kannen).
The former refers to the knowledge, opinions, and evaluation
of the existing legal system under specific conditions, while the
latter refers to a conception of law "as an abstract, ideal image"
(ibid., p. 193). He also introduces a parallel typology of kenriishiki ("rights consciousness") and kenri-kannen ("rights conception"), referring respectively to knowledge, opinions, and
evaluation of specific rights and to a general framework of perceiving and evaluating social relationships in terms of clear,
universalistic rules that define each person's rights and are applied irrespective of the actual power relationships between the
parties. According to Rokumoto, Kawashima was talking about
the legal conception and the rights conception.
Kawashima (1967) in fact discusses these conceptions and
applies his general thesis to specific areas such as property, contract, and civil litigation. He argues that the Japanese, unlike
modern Europeans, do not conceive of their social relationships
in terms of universal standards of rights and duties and that
the Japanese legal consciousness reflects this form of rights
consciousness. Japanese expect the law to be indeterminate
in both its content and its status as a norm. Nonlitigiousness
is just one result of this legal consciousness (ibid., p. 127). Although Kawashima has not responded to either Haley or

MIYAZAWA

223

Rokumoto, Rokumoto's explication seems fair. Nonlitigiousness may be a dependent variable of Japanese legal conception,
but it is not Japanese legal conception itself (Rokumoto, 1986b).
However, Kawashima does not necessarily give us an empirical indicator of the traditional Japanese legal consciousness
that was measured separately from its dependent variables. Instead, Kawashima tends to assume the traditional legal consciousness behind anecdotes presented for dependent variables
and cites, for instance, judicial statistics as evidence of changes
in it. Thus, Haley's criticism was also fair as it corresponded
with what Kawashima was actually doing with his data. What
we must measure is Japanese legal consciousness, separated
from such behavioral patterns as litigation rate, at the level explicated by Rokumoto.
There is another element in Kawashima's argument,
the implication of which has not been empirically explored.
Although the Kawashima thesis should be fundamentally
viewed as a discussion of culture, one of his justifications for his
interest in legal consciousness is at the level of individual attitude (Kawashima, 1967: 6-14). At this level, legal consciousness is said to have the three components of perception, value
judgment, and emotion, which evoke the three elements of attitude outlined by Rosenberg and Hovland (1960). Legal consciousness analysis is expected to provide explanations of individual law-related behavior at the closest, motivational level.
While Kawashima's recent explication (1982: 404-405) emphasizes its cultural nature, I suspect that legal consciousness is
more amenable to empirical research at this level than at the
aggregate, cultural level. Furthermore, aggregate-level relationships between culture and behavioral patterns demand an
empirical explication to understand their inherent causal relationships. We thus need empirical research at both levels.
IV.

LARGE-SCALE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEYS OF
AGGREGATE-LEVEL CULTURE

Since Kawashima's works appeared, the dominant form of
analysis of the Japanese legal consciousness has been anecdotal.
A critical problem with this approach is that, given the complexities of any society, one can always find some episodes that
apparently support one's thesis. As part of their broader criticism of this method, for instance, Sugimoto and Mouer (1982:
chap. 11) could easily find examples that suggest a description
of Japan which is opposite from the standard stereotype and is
instead an individualistic society where people are always en-
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gaged in dry calculation and are exposed to constant controls
from the powerful.
Of course, to be persuasive, any analysis must explain our
daily experiences of the real world. What we need, then, are
representative data that provide a context in which anecdotal
data can be properly evaluated. Questionnaire surveys have
been conducted to collect such data about dominant culture.
What distinguishes the Japanese surveys on legal consciousness
is that, unlike their foreign counterparts (e.g., Podgorecki et al.,
1973; Curran, 1977; Gibson and Baldwin, 1985), they have been
expected to provide information on something more general
than knowledge, opinions, and demands about the existing legal
system.
Major surveys on legal consciousness have been conducted
by the Nippon Bunka Kaigi (Japan Culture Forum) (1973;
1982), the Osaka Bengoshikai (Osaka Bar Association) (1977),
the Kyoto Daigaku Hogakubu (Kyoto University Faculty of
Law) (1978), and the Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai (Japanese Federation of Bar Associations) (1986). The last survey is particularly large (a national sample of 2,315) and rich (402 questions).
However, its data have not yet been fully examined. Therefore,
I cite samples of questions and response distributions from the
Nippon Bunka Kaigi (NBK) and the Kyoto Daigaku Hogakubu
(KDH) projects.
The first study by the NBK was the earliest large-scale
sample survey on legal consciousness in Japan. It was conducted in 1971 and based on a representative sample of 1,053
Tokyo area residents. In 1976 NBK conducted a follow-up survey of the same area with 1,080 respondents. Table 1 presents
some of the data.
The results of the surveys were ambiguous. Apparently
contradictory patterns appear for Questions 15 and 16. On the
one hand, notwithstanding the stereotypes about Japanese legal
behavior, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated
that they preferred detailed contracts. On the other hand, a
majority also indicated a rather relaxed view about the bindingness of a contract, a result consistent with the stereotype. Apparently contradictory results were also obtained for other areas, including the administration of criminal justice, and the
project reporters interpreted these results to mean that the
Japanese hold strict views about the formal legal system as an
institution but at the same time expect flexible enforcement.
They also interpreted the responses to Questions 32 and 33 to
indicate flexibility.
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Table 1. Selected Questions from the Nippon Bunka Kaigi
Surveys (in percent)*

Question 15: What would you do if a contract
became unsuited to the actual situation a few
years after it was made?
1. However unsuitable, a contract is a
contract, and I would abide by it.
2. I would discuss with the other party
whether the contract could be ignored.
3. Don't know/no answer.
Question 16: Which statement most closely
reflects your opinion?
1. Because a contract is a formality, it is
better to make written contracts as
simple as possible and descriptions in it
as flexible as possible.
2. It is better to include as many details
and concrete descriptions in a contract
as possible so that a dispute will not
arise.
3. Don't know/no answer.
Question 32: Which statement most closely
reflects your opinion?
1. Laws should enable us to live more
comfortably with each other.
2. Laws should realize justice in the
world.
3. Don't know/no answer.

1971

1976

(N = 1,053)

(N = 1,080)

31.6

31.7

64.3

61.7

4.1

6.6

8.5

6.3

89.5

89.1

2.0

4.7

54.5

49.5

42.0

39.8

3.5

10.7

Question.3 Do you agree with the
statement that "We should abide by the law
of the country even if we believe it to be
unjust"?
1. Agree.
2. Do not totally agree.
3. Totally disagree.
4. Don't know/no answer.
Question42: Would you consider suing if
your rights were violated?
1. Immediately.
2. Occasionally.
3. No, unless the matter were extremely
really grave.
4. Don't know/no answer.
Question 43: Do you agree with the
statement that "Litigation is expensive and
time-consuming, and even when you win, you
will usually lose money"?
1. Agree.
2. Disagree.
3. Don't know/no answer.

28.9
59.0
7.0
5.1

22.8
24.0
49.9

11.1
23.7
60.6

3.3

4.5

58.8
27.1
14.2

59.6
21.6
18.7
(continued)

*

Unfortunately the authors of these studies have not provided tests of significance of differences in these data.
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Table 1. (continued)
1971
(N = 1,053)
Question 44: Which statement most closely
reflects your opinion?
1. If you think it is better to sue, you may
do so.
2. Suing is not the most desirable action,
but you may use court-sponsored
mediation or formal discussion as much
as you wish.
3. You should try to avoid bringing suit
whenever possible and instead work to
resolve the matter through private
discussions.
4. Don't know/no answer.

1976
(N = 1,080)

8.6

8.1

39.7

42.7

46.6

41.3

5.0

7.8

More relevant to the conventional understanding of Japanese legal culture as nonlitigious may be Questions 42, 43, and
44. Only a minority of respondents to Questions 42 and 44 gave
positive responses regarding the use of litigation, a result supportive of the stereotype. However, the response to Question 43
also suggests a calculative basis for this aversion to litigation.
What the researchers most emphasized was the drastic decline
in the most positive response to Question 42 between 1971 and
1976, as its percentage fell by one-half.
Several methodological problems in these surveys have
been noted (Rokumoto, 1983a). Some questions were so abstract that the respondents were asked about matters most of
them had never considered. Others, such as Question 43, encompassed more than one issue. These projects often used only
one question for a very broad issue (e.g., Question 42 for the violation of rights and Question 44 for the use of courts) on
which different responses could be expected under specific conditions. Certain questions also had response categories that
were not mutually exclusive. For instance, among the answers
to Question 32, a comfortable life (guai no yoi seikatsu) and the
realization of justice (seigi no jitsugen) may coexist. In short,
we may be skeptical about the validity of the results.
There is also a problem of reliability. Consider Question
42, for example. While the second survey repeated the same
question to a representative sample in the same area only five
years after the initial survey, the percentage share of the first
response category became one half. Considering the very general character of the question, this change may raise doubts
about the reliability of the entire project. Should we believe
that the Japanese became more conservative so abruptly?
Most importantly, these two NBK projects are not directly
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relevant to our renewed interest in Kawashima's concept of
legal consciousness, namely what Rokumoto called legal conception and rights conception. According to Rokumoto's explication, we have to measure the general normative framework
that forms the basis of, for example, relaxed views on the bindingness of contracts or unwillingness to sue. This is not a fault
of the NBK projects, which were planned before Rokumoto's
explication. But it is nonetheless a problem we must face.
Table 2 presents data from the KDH project. The survey,
which was conducted in 1977, was the first to use a national
sample (N = 1,601). The Kyoto project's questionnaire was an
improvement over those used in the NBK projects. Questions
were less ambiguous and several were constructed to measure a
single subject under different conditions. Another new device
was to present both questions regarding conflict management
in general and questions regarding the use of courts and legal
professionals in particular so that the former would be correlated with the latter. (In Table 2, Questions 20 and 21b are the
first type and Questions 22 through 26 are the second.)
The responses to Questions 22 through 26 suggest several
conclusions. When a problem involves a continuing social relationship, the trouble is most likely to be ignored and a court is
least likely to be used (Questions 24 and 25). The greater the
actual or potential damage, the more likely it is that the court
and the legal profession will be used (Questions 23 and 26).
Unfortunately, no scale was constructed for Questions 22
through 26 in spite of its obvious feasibility, and the responses
to these questions were not correlated with those to Questions
20 and 21b. However, when the responses to Questions 20 and
21b were correlated with answers to questions regarding the
handling of an improperly issued traffic ticket and a defective
toy, those who answered that they would present the problem
to the other party or that they would seek a logical solution
more often indicated that they would bring such matters to the
court.
We now know that more thorough questionnaires are required to test Kawashima's thesis. Answers to Questions 22
through 26, for instance, do not indicate whether the respondents' aversion to courts was based on a general cultural framework or on rational calculation. We must thus devise new ways
of dealing with Kawashima's concept, and we definitely need a
scale of legal consciousness. Eysenck's (1954) scale of conservatism-in which he infers conservatism from responses to questions on ethnocentrism, child rearing, religion, patriotism, and
the like-is a possible model. It may be impossible to agree on
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Table 2.

Selected Questions from the Kyoto Daigaku
Hogakubu Survey (in percent)
1977
(N = 1,601)

Question 20; What would you do if you had problems
with your neighbor?
1. Clearly present the problems to my neighbor.
2. Restrain myself to prevent further trouble.

3.

Depends on the problems.

4.

Don't know.

27.9
38.2

29.9
4.0

Question 21b: Which of the following solutions for
conflicts and problems with others would you favor?
1. Make it clear which is right and which is wrong,
and seek a logical solution.
2. Seek a solution that fits the nature of the trouble.
3. Can't choose.
4. Don't know.

Action to Take'
(percent)

Case
Question 22: My six-monthold refrigerator does not
work well and the store
refuses to exchange it for a
new one.
Question 23: After my new
house was built, I was asked
to pay Y 1 million more
than the initial estimate.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.

4.2
60.6
19.2
8.9
7.1
3.6
46.8
22.7
18.1

45.3
33.9
15.7
5.1

Mediator to Callb
(percent)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

36.6
2.8
20.4
11.9
28.2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

31.1
5.0
11.5
30.4
21.9

Question 24: My child was
injured while playing in the
schoolyard and received a
small scar on her face.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

26.7
6.8
14.0
13.4
39.2

Question 25: The piano
teacher next door plays
unbearable noise after 9 P.M.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

32.1
7.7
20.1
9.2
30.8

Question 26: My brand-new
television caught fire, but I
extinguished it before it
burned more than a small
portion of my room.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

20.1
2.9
31.3
23.0
22.7

aAction to Take:

bMediator to Call:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Do nothing.
Negotiate with the other party; no further action.
Ask someone to mediate; no further action.
If (2) and (3) failed, file suit or use court action.
Don't know.
1. Relative, friend, or other familiar person.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Local legislator or other official.
Administrative agency or police.
Attorney or other legal professional.
Can't choose.
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a single question that would measure legal consciousness. However, we may still be able to form a rough consensus on specific
situations that can be regarded as expressions of Japanese legal
consciousness.
A more ambitious project would construct a scale to be
used in cross-national, comparative analysis. After all, any one
country's culture can be characterized only in relation to other
cultures. For instance, following Kawashima strictly, it may be
interesting to construct scales of specificity-universality and informality-formality for the standards to be applied in dispute
processing. Considering the extremely abstract character of
Kawashima's rights consciousness, Rokumoto (1986b: 298) has
recently proposed a less abstract concept of "rule-orientedness."
One may expect that its operationalization will also result in
the construction of a scale.
The next task is to use legal culture as thus measured to
explain the activities of the formal legal system at the aggregate level. Just as we use individual attitudes to explain individual behavior, we may think of using aggregate-level culture
to explain aggregate-level behavioral patterns such as the litigation rate.
In this regard, many people may consider trying to explain
cross-national differences in the operation of the formal legal
system by differences in national legal cultures measured by
uniform scales. I am skeptical about such research, however.
Reliance on official statistics is inevitable in this work, but the
comparability of such data is always problematic (Sarat and
Grossman, 1975). Furthermore, to avoid Kawashima's tendency
of directly connecting legal culture to indices or anecdotes of
systemic operation, we need to control other relevant variables.
I suspect that some are extremely difficult to measure with uniform scales. For instance, what is the American equivalent of
the nonattorney legal specialists found in Japan? How does
one deal with doctrinal differences that limit access to the formal legal system independent of legal culture?
My plan is to conduct an interregionalcomparison of Japan. We need not worry much about legal culture if it does not
help explain the operation of the formal legal system. If regional variations in legal consciousness are discovered and if, after proper control, such differences are found to be related to
regional variations in the operation of the legal system, we may
say at least that legal culture is significant.
Tanase's (1977) analysis on the determinants of the per
capita rate of pro se civil litigation is instructive in this regard.
After an analysis of official statistics for Japanese prefectures,
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he concludes, contrary to a commonsensical expectation that
the per capita number of attorneys is inversely correlated with
the rate of pro se litigation, that the rate of pro se litigation is
in fact determined by per capita income. The higher the income, the lower the rate of pro se litigation. What we should
do, therefore, is to examine whether the introduction of regional legal culture, measured in terms of majority responses to
uniform scales, affects the relative impact of socioeconomic and
institutional factors on this rate. I believe such a project is feasible.
V.

INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION

No one has seriously explored legal consciousness as an attitudinal factor of individual behavior in empirical research.
This is somewhat surprising since even in Japan longitudinal
studies on the relationship between attitudes and behavior are
no longer unusual. Indeed, such studies are quite common in
the research on political behavior, particularly voting behavior,
conducted by political scientists who are, at most Japanese universities, members of law faculties.
I do not mean, however, that there have been no major empirical studies of individual behavior in dispute resolution. In
fact, I would like to summarize three examples. Sasaki's book
on mediation in the court (1974) was probably the first attempt
by any Japanese scholar to criticize the stereotype of Japanese
legal behavior. The first edition of his book appeared in 1967,
when Kawashima's Nihon-jin no Ho-ishiki [The Japanese Legal Consciousness] was also published. From 1958 through
1961, Sasaki conducted mailed questionnaire surveys of 2,034
residents of Shimane prefecture and 2,411 city residents of
Osaka prefecture; examined the records of all civil mediation
cases processed in 1957 by a district court in Shimane (441
cases) and a district court and a summary court in Osaka (2,944
cases) and conducted mailed questionnaire surveys of the parties of those cases (384 in Shimane and 1,811 in Osaka); and
conducted mailed questionnaire surveys of 74 volunteer mediation commissioners in Shimane and of 82 in Osaka. It is easy to
criticize the use of mailed questionnaires that do not guarantee
the identity of respondents. However, because these surveys
were carried out almost thirty years ago in Japan about a subject considered confidential, they were quite a heroic effort.
Tables 3 and 4 present some of Sasaki's data. The responses to the question on the willingness to use the court (see
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Table 3) give the impression that Sasaki's subjects were more
willing to do so than the more contemporary subjects of Table 1
and Table 2. "Court" here meant litigation. Reasons 2 through
4 for the negative responses to the use of courts may be closest
to the conventional notion of traditional Japanese legal consciousness. Rural residents were more afraid of the reactions of
the other party and neighbors than were urbanites, a result
that might be taken as support for both the conventional view
as well as for my proposal that we initiate interregional comparative studies of activities of the formal legal system.
However, the main point of these findings is that the most
frequent reasons given for avoiding litigation concerned the
costs involved rather than beliefs rooted in the traditional consciousness. The issue is how disputes can be resolved if litigation is not used; court-sponsored mediation may be one means.
In other words, the public may see mediation as a substitute for
litigation in realizing legally justifiable interests rather than as
a mechanism for realizing conventionally assumed purposes
such as restoring harmonious social relationships.
The data on complaints heard from the parties who had actually been involved in mediation might be cited to support this
interpretation (see Table 4). These parties sought mediation
expecting both more involvement from the judge, who is nominally the chairman of the mediation commission, and binding
resolutions based on more complete investigations of the facts
(for similar observations regarding family court mediation, see
Bryant, 1984). The reality of mediation, however, is that most
cases are handled only by lay commissioners and that the commission does not have authority to make a binding decision.
Presented this way, Sasaki's project should have attracted more
attention as a study on individual attitudes and behavior in dispute resolution.
Unfortunately, Sasaki did not ask the involved parties
their specific reasons for choosing mediation. We cannot be
sure to what extent we can infer the existence of a high degree
of interest consciousness behind behavior seeking mediation.
The first attempt to reconstruct individual dispute processes
retrospectively did not occur in Japan until 1968, when
Rokumoto conducted his dissertation research (1971).
Rokumoto wanted to discover the factors that determined
the degree of the legalization of social ordering in Japan. He
defined legalization as the process through which society comes
to rely increasingly on the formal legal system to maintain order. He first sent a card asking a representative sample of 2,013
residents of the Bunkyo ward of Tokyo if they had been in-
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Table 4.

Complaints about the Mediation Process by the
Complaining Party in Sasaki's Surveys (in percent)*
Shimane (1959) Osaka (1961)
(N = 210)
(N = 365)

1. The mediation commissioners did not fully
understand the situation.
11.4
33.4
2. The judge should hear the case by himself more
often.
14.3
25.2
3. The commissioners were not impartial.
8.1
9.0
4. The commissioners believed the respondent's lie.
19.0
20.0
5. The commissioners should make their proposals
after more investigation.
21.0
35.3
* Some made no complaint in Shimane, while some made more than one complaint
in Osaka.

volved in automobile accidents or housing disputes. He then interviewed 103 of the 226 respondents who answered affirmatively. Rokumoto reported data on forty-five accident cases and
forty housing cases. Only three of the accident cases reached a
court, while eleven of the housing cases went to litigation and
another eleven went to mediation. Attorneys were used in only
three accident cases but in thirty housing cases. Seemingly
against the conventional view of the role of local officials in Japan, local politicians and police did not play any significant role
in these cases. Instead, particularly in accident cases, nonattorneys who were nevertheless specialists in automobile accidents,
such as insurance agents and accident managers of taxi companies, figured conspicuously as agents for parties, thus raising
the possibility that these specialists sometimes engaged in the
arbitrary manipulation of legal rules, exploitation of ignorant
opponents, or deceit. The outcomes of these cases indicated
that the parties who retained attorneys or specialists could expect favorable results.
Rokumoto's main argument is that the chance to obtain the
assistance of attorneys and specialists and hence to mobilize the
formal legal system to one's advantage is unevenly distributed
in society. The people with the greatest advantage are those
who are by occupation repeat users of legal specialists, most notably professional landlords (a result that reminds us of Mayhew and Reiss's work [1969] to which Rokumoto in fact refers).
Those with the second greatest advantage belong to natural
networks that include legal specialists. For those outside these
groups, it is difficult to obtain legal counsel in Japan. Even
when one is able to retain legal representation, parties without
a previous relationship with the specialists, however indirect,
will often find it hard to receive full, personal service.
As for legal consciousness, even mediation is a deliberate
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attempt to enforce one's legally protected interests. In some
cases, mediation is used to block the use of litigation by the
other party, whose legal basis may be much stronger. In contemporary Japan, at least in urban areas, parties use both mediation and litigation to pursue their own interests. These results
apparently differ from a commonsensical version of the Kawashima thesis.
However, Rokumoto does not regard such interest-mindedness as the truly modem legal consciousness. Instead, he implies that this thinking lacks internalization of universalistic
standards, acceptance of the reciprocity of right-duty relationships, and reliance on the court as an objective adjudicator. Indeed, the mobilization of law does not necessarily reflect legal
consciousness, even in the sense of interest-mindedness. After
all, if one happened to be in one of those networks mentioned
above, the assistance of legal specialists would naturally be
provided. In light of this argument, it seems logical that
Rokumoto tries to resurrect Kawashima's conception of legal
consciousness through his explication.
The second example of a retrospective analysis of disputing
behavior is Wada's (1983-84) recent work. Using an expanded
version of Felstiner et al.'s (1980-81) model of the formation
and transformation of grievances, he first sent a questionnaire
to a representative sample of 976 residents of a Tokyo suburb in
1982. He asked if they had been involved in "troubles"
(mondai) in any of ten specified fields. He interviewed 169 of
the 312 respondents who answered affirmatively. The data
were presented for 107.
Wada distinguished six stages of grievance transformation,
in the following progression: (1) an injurious experience is perceived (PIE); (2) someone is blamed and a PIE becomes a grievance; (3) the claiming party makes a demand and the grievance
becomes a claim; (4) the responding party rejects the claim and
a dispute issues; (5) the claiming party makes a second claim
and a negotiation starts; and (6) one party resorts to mediation,
arbitration, or even litigation. Almost three-quarters of all
cases ended before the negotiation stage. Grievances most frequently involved neighbors (33 cases), but two-thirds of the
neighbor cases ended before the dispute stage. The second largest group of cases involved grievances about housing or land
tenancy (14 cases). Unlike other types of cases, half of these
reached at least the negotiation stage, and two cases reached
the court. Wada's findings are thus consistent with Rokumoto's
data on housing disputes.
Wada tried to identify the factors that determined how far
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a grievance would proceed in this transformation process. He
distinguished three types of factors: (1) relationalfactors, or
the effects of the ongoing social relationships between the parties; (2) technical factors, or the party's subjective knowledge
about law, the objective legal merits of the case, and his or her
realistic chance of winning; and (3) value factors, or the magnitude and urgency of the grievance. He concluded that value
and relational factors carried greatest weight in earlier stages
of the transformation process, causing smaller, neighborhood or
family cases to drop out at these stages. If a case reached the
dispute stage, technical factors started to dominate. At the negotiation and court stages, technical factors such as the objective merit of the case or the realistic likelihood of winning became almost the only determinants. It should be easy to see a
link between Wada's findings and Rokumoto's data on the importance of the availability of technical assistance. Wada did
not say much about legal consciousness or attitudinal factors.
We again receive the impression that they do not much matter
and that the processing of individual grievances can be explained almost totally by objective factors.
But such impression may well be an artifact of Rokumoto's
and Wada's research designs. Because they retrospectively collected information on dispute processing, they did not have a
chance to measure attitudes directly before grievances materialized or to relate previously measured attitudes to later behavior. I conclude, therefore, that the importance of individual attitudes as explanatory variables for individual dispute behavior
has not yet been seriously studied, much less resolved. This, I
believe, is where research efforts should be directed.
I am in the most preliminary stage of a project on this subject. It is clear, however, that I will have to design a longitudinal study with at least two measurements of the same sample.
In the first survey, for instance, I should measure the respondents' attitudes regarding law and their place in networks that
would make specialists available for various types of disputes.
The second survey would then retrospectively ask if any disputes had arisen, how they had been handled, and for what reasons. Sociological characteristics of the respondents and their
relationship with the other party should also be analyzed in
terms of such variables as stratification, morphology, cultural
conventionality, and the availability of nonlegal forms of social
control under given social relationships (Black, 1976).
The history of social-psychological studies of attitude-behavior relationships indicates the need for caution. Since
LaPiere's classical study (1934) of the inconsistency between
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verbally expressed ethnic discrimination of hotel and restaurant operators and their actual responses to Chinese persons,
research on attitude-behavior relationships has consistently demonstrated the discontinuity of such relationships. One way to
increase correlations between attitudes and behavior is to construct a scale of general features of behavior on the basis of
multiple instances of behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974) and
correlate attitudes with such a scale rather than with a single
instance of behavior. However, exactly because the disputing
behavior is likely to be infrequent, such a strategy is not feasible.
We could approach the problem from the other side of the
attitude-behavior nexus by developing a scale of legal attitudes.
Eysenck's conservatism scale may again be a model. I suspect,
however, that in constructing a scale for this purpose, the
highly abstract nature of Kawashima's concept of legal consciousness is likely to be unproductive at an individual level.
Social psychologists have argued that if we want to explain specific instances of behavior, we should measure attitudes toward
stimuli directly related to the given behavior (Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1975). Although Rokumoto (1986b: 298) has recently
proposed translating Kawashima's concept into less abstract
terms, he has not yet achieved this goal, and his concept of
rule-orientedness itself seems fairly abstract.
Of course, it is impossible to construct a scale at a level exactly the same as that of daily stimuli. But we may still try to
list a sample of situations in which the use of the formal legal
system might at least be one possible response. This also
means, however, that given a realistic limitation on the size of
the questionnaire, we should study just one small sphere of
daily life at any given time. If (and this is a big "if" considering
the current state of Japanese law and society scholarship)
many researchers approached many different areas of life with
similar instruments, such a piecemeal examination would gradually give us a fuller understanding of the entire picture.
If this approach were taken, what would happen to the
study of aggregate-level culture? I believe that aggregate-level
culture can be introduced into individual-level analysis as a social interactive factor. I of course mean to borrow from Mead's
(1934) notion of the generalized other. The generalized other
may be translated into empirical terms as prevailing, dominant
expectations and attitudes held by a majority of members of a
given group or a region. Because any injurious experience is a
breakdown of the order of injured persons' routines, they must
first find a definition of the harmful situation and then a defini-
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tion of their proper responses to it. Their own attitudes may be
an important source of such definitions. However, exactly because such an experience is infrequent, the people may want to
refer to what others think or would think about the situation
either to define the situation and their responses or to justify
personal definitions. Indeed, part of the impact of the legal specialists Rokumoto found may be in providing such definitions.
If so, during the first survey of our longitudinal study, we
should measure how respondents perceive the dominant views
about different forms of injurious experience among the people
around them. We should consider the respondents' perceptions
of the views of people at several layers of proximity, starting
probably with family members. Ideally, we should have a sample from different regions, the cultures of which we would already have surveyed. In the second survey, we would ask respondents what they actually referred to in making decisions.
In the final analysis, respondents' previous perceptions, references during the disputing process, and separately measured regional legal cultures would all be used as explanatory variables.
Aggregate-level culture and individual-level attitude would
thus be combined in one research project.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to reevaluate my Japanese colleagues' studies
in light of explications of the Kawashima thesis with regard to
both the meaning of the concept of legal consciousness and its
dual status as group culture and an individual attitudinal factor.
I have also offered general ideas about possible empirical research on the basis of these studies. I am afraid, however, that
I have presented Kawashima too seriously to international colleagues, most of whom are not likely to be familiar with him,
and that I have been too behavioristic. In fact, I am not a student of Kawashima nor particularly behavioristic in my previous works, which instead display a strongly organizational approach, with a touch of interactionist perspective in my
emphasis on participant observation as a research method
(Miyazawa, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c).
I nonetheless wanted first to give international colleagues a
sense of what is going on in Japanese law and society scholarship. I then chose a behavioristic approach exactly because it
has been absent in research on Japanese legal consciousness. I
wanted to break the stereotype of a Japanese scholar adopting
an anecdotal approach. Another, more essential reason for my
behavioristic approach was my desire to spur international
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scholars to conduct serious empirical research in Japan. Even
recent studies on Japan abound with exoticism. For instance,
even Ames's (1981) fine book on Japanese police describes too
often a stereotypical samurai instead of presenting supposedly
rich observational data gained from his study of police stations
for over a year. What we need is research that does not explain
away Japan by attributing every finding to "Japanese uniqueness" but instead applies theories and methods that treat Japan
as a point on a universal continuum.
In this regard, it should be remembered that Eysenck's
scale was used by an American political scientist to measure
legal conservatism in Japan: Dator (1969) administered the
scale to none other than Japanese Supreme Court justices and
high court judges. Although Dator did not use his results to explain the judicial behavior of those justices and judges, he at
least gave us hope that a behavioristic approach could be applied in studies of law and society in Japan. Colleagues from
around the world should try an approach that combines an observational, qualitative method with a behavioral, quantitative
method to achieve this goal.
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